differentiation with the adoption rate of previous non-adopters decreasing following adoption by competitors. Generally, the literature finds the opposite result and attributes it either to a spillover of information from adopters to non-adopters or the effects of cost reduction by rivals on non-adopters' market share.
The effect that innovation has on a firm's quality of service can also explain the nature of persistent adoption. To illustrate this point we include in this chapter evidence of persistent adoption for high-speed chairlift technology that accounts for the unique characteristics of the technology and the quality of service provided by the skiing industry. A major advantage of high-speed chairlift technology for a study of persistent adoption is that it has not undergone significant modification since its first appearance in the United States in 1981. In addition, its characteristics were well known to the U.S. ski industry early on, given that it had already been introduced previously in Europe and had received extensive coverage in the trade literature. As a result, a diffusion study of chairlift technology is less susceptible to the criticism coming from the evolutionary diffusion literature directed at studies based on the assumption of well-informed, profitmaximizing firms.
Unlike potential adopters of most other process innovations, ski resorts compete in either local or national submarkets with different levels of quality. This distinction has implications not only for a ski resort's decision to make an initial adoption of high-speed technology but also for the degree of persistence. In Section 3, we provide evidence suggesting that while ski resorts initially adopted high-speed chairlifts in order to differentiate the quality of their service in local markets, ski resorts in national/international submarket were most likely to increase the proportion of their capacity using high-speed technology. We attribute the persistence of adoption to endogenous quality competition in the national submarket consistent with the general implications of work on endogenous quality by Sutton (1991 and 1998) . On the other hand, in local markets there is less of an incentive for persistent adoption due to the heterogeneity of the local skiing population and constraints on skiable acres.
THE LITERATURE
While the main focus of this chapter is innovation that improves the speed of a firm's service, we start with a survey of the diffusion literature having implications for persistent adoption of process innovations. Although there is an extensive literature that pertains at least indirectly to persistent adoption, the main issues addressed vary considerably and suggest several ways of organizing this work. We have grouped these papers in four general if not entirely mutually exclusive categories: (a) strategic models of continuous investment in technology, (b) learning-by-doing, (c) endogenous quality and vertical differentiation, and (d) neoclassical models of inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion of specific innovations along with criticism of these models coming from the evolutionary diffusion literature.
Strategic Models of Continuous Investment
There is a growing and extensive literature that acknowledges that innovation is often a continuous process. While papers in this literature have various objectives, expectations about the timing, cost, and importance of subsequent improvements in the initial technology all play a role. A prevailing objective concerns the pattern of multiple adoptions and their impact on market leadership with recent experience in rapid innovation in computer technology as a motivating example in many cases. Depending on the assumptions made, firms may either persist in adopting improvements in the technology or delay further adoption.
For example, Thomas (1999) considers empirically the order of adoption for new technology in the computer disk drive industry. His main conclusion is that large firms and incumbents are more likely to adopt minor improvements in the technology with entrants and small firms more likely to adopt innovations that make existing products obsolete. These results are consistent with work by Klepper (1996) on the product life cycle where entrants and smaller firms are the primary adopters of new products. In Thomas' model entrants have a size disadvantage relative to incumbents regarding existing technology and must adopt the new technologies to gain an advantage. Incumbent firms have an incentive to adopt completely new technologies later given that they have already invested in a viable technology. On the other hand, incremental changes in the technology have an effect on efficiency that favors existing firms, which are generally relatively larger.
Thomas provides empirical evidence that the adoption decision was based on both firm size and the nature of the change in the technology. He found that in the workstation submarket the innovation of 3.5" disk drives made the 5.25" technology obsolete, while the same technological change in the desktop and portable submarkets did not eliminate the older technology as a viable option. Incumbents adopted later in the workstation market, but earlier in the other submarket. As a result, knowledge of the effect that the innovation has on the firm's production process and on the consumers of the firm's product is critical in explaining the adoption process.
Earlier, Farzin, Huisman, and Kort (1998) used a dynamic programming model of multiple technology switches given uncertainty about the speed of arrival of new technologies and the magnitude of improvement in productivity. An important feature of the model is that switching costs are assumed to be sunk in order to capture the effect of technological obsolescence. Their model implicitly rules out the possibility that the firm could use both technologies together. They argue that the literature generally focuses on uncertainty about future market conditions and prices, which they hold constant in their model. Their model suggests that the possibility that a more efficient process technology will appear in the future causing firms to delay adoption of improvements of the existing technology. Athey and Schmutzler (2001) develop a more general model to consider the possibility that a low-cost or high-quality firm will be able to maintain an initial lead over its competitors through persistent advertising, low-price offers to attract new customers, or investments in product and process innovations which are either cost-reducing or demand-enhancing. They establish general conditions for increased market dominance that they apply to many applications, such as network effects, learning by doing, and endogenous quality. In their model two or more oligopolists compete over time with investment possible in each period. Investments can have small or large marginal effects on next period costs or demand. Firms invest in cumulative cost reduction, product quality, a larger stock of loyal customers, or the number of products offered. Their main objective was the derivation of general conditions for whether or not actions are strategic substitutes or complements. Strategic substitutes imply that the incremental benefit from an action, such as a firm's investment in a process innovation decreases with an increase in a competitor's action. Cost reduction and increased product quality can lead to market dominance with ambiguous welfare effects. Since a leading firm may use continuous investment to maintain its market position, their model does imply a role for persistent adoption in a competitive environment.
Learning-By-Doing
Several papers incorporating assumptions about learning-by-doing also have implications for persistence depending on how quickly firms learn to use the innovation and the extent of information spillovers. The nature of the learning process varies from paper to paper. In some cases learning-by-doing implies persistence, while in others the learning process may actually impede persistent adoption. Despite these differences, this research has in common an emphasis on cost-reducing as opposed to quality-enhancing process innovations.
Learning can come from the firm's own experience with a current or earlier vintage or from the experiences of competitors. For example, Kapur (1995) models a waiting contest with firms delaying adoption in order to learn from those who do adopt. As additional firms adopt, non-adopters update their information concerning the costs of switching to the new technology. This process results in firms adopting at different time periods even though the firms are identical a priori. Giovanetti (2001) also provides a model where firms delay adoption of new vintages. In his case, however, firms have a cost advantage that comes from continued use of the same vintage. Since learning-by-doing provides no explicit cost advantage from having used an earlier vintage or from learning from others' experiences, this form of learning-by-doing would actually impede persistent adoptions of improvements in the technology. It is even possible to have a leapfrogging of market leaders who alternate as the firm with the latest technology. To show this, Giovanetti models a duopoly with Bertrand competition and continuous innovation providing a sequence of cost-reducing technology. He offers innovations in PC processors as an example. In his model leapfrogging is a necessary condition for long-run technological improvement with the likelihood of leapfrogging depending on the nature of demand for the products produced by the technology.
In a similar vein Karp and Lee (2001) have a model of technology adoption with learning-by-doing where firms using an existing technology may resist adopting a newer technology that requires learning before the full benefit of the technology is realized, especially when there is a high opportunity cost due to lower profits during the learning time period. As a result, firms that have not made an investment in a technology with learning costs have a lower opportunity cost of adopting a new technology. Karp and Lee consider the diffusion pattern with both myopic and forward-looking firms. In some cases lagging firms may overtake leading firms. In their model a high discount rate makes overtaking more likely as relatively backward firms overtake the relatively more technologically advanced firms. On the other hand, forward-looking firms may upgrade to acquire higher skill levels and persist in upgrading more frequently than firms that are not forward-looking.
By contrast, Cabral and Leiblein (2001) find in the case of semiconductor technology that learning-by-doing coming from experience with the most recent vintage of the technology does give firms an incentive to persist in adopting the next vintage even when controlling for firm size. On the other hand, they find no evidence of spillover effects from much earlier vintages or evidence of regional spillover effects due to competitors' adoptions. Persistent adoption comes from accumulated experience with a cost-saving technology.
Taken as a group these papers suggest that persistent adoption for innovations where learning-by-doing is important depends critically on the nature of the learning process. As was the case for the models surveyed in Section 2.1, particular attention needs to be paid to how the innovation actually affects the production process.
Endogenous Quality
Although not generally included in the literature on technological diffusion, work on market structure and performance by Sutton (1991 and 1998) has implications for the persistent adoption of quality-enhancing innovations. In order to enter a market, firms in Sutton's model incur a sunk fixed cost which is exogenously determined by the technology for producing the good. This cost is the minimum necessary to be able to produce at minimum efficient scale. Free entry results in zero economic profits in longrun equilibrium if firms compete either in Cournot competition or accommodate entry at a collusive price. In markets where product quality is important to consumers, firms make quality-enhancing investments involving sunk costs. These costs are, however, endogenous and increase for each firm as the market expands over time. While Sutton's main emphasis is the effect that quality-enhancing investments in advertising (Sutton, 1991) or R and D (Sutton, 1998) have on market concentration as market size increases over time, the theoretical approach has implications for persistence of adoption. To the extent quality is determined by the firm's process technology Sutton's model implies that firms would continue endogenously to adopt qualityenhancing improvements in the technology as the market increases. Improvements in quality can lead to horizontal differentiation if markets are competitive and if firms attempt to avoid direct competition with rivals, but the main point of his work is showing how markets may remain concentrated even with expansion in market size and zero profits in long-run equilibrium.
Competition among existing firms making endogenously determined investments in quality increase the degree of vertical differentiation as market size expands. As long as consumers have a common preference for quality, firms may compete by making quality-enhancing investments. In the strictest version of the Sutton model, these investments are assumed to be both fixed and sunk with little impact on variable costs. The level of quality at a point in time is determined endogenously by consumer preferences for quality, the price of an additional unit of quality and the size of the market. Changes in market size over time are due to increases in population and income per capita. Since the main focus of Sutton's approach is the relationship between market size and the degree of concentration in the market and not specifically on the diffusion pattern of innovations, his model is essentially static. For example, while he acknowledges that incumbency can give a firm an advantage by allowing it to determine a level of quality (and investment in quality) that makes entry unprofitable, his model does not explicitly account for the dynamic nature of investments in quality over time.
In a recent application of Sutton's modeling approach to the supermarket industry, Ellickson (2003) assumes that supermarkets invest in distribution technology that could either lower unit costs or raise the quality of the goods sold by the adopting firm. More efficient distribution networks result in larger stores. Ellickson defines quality as the size of a company's store, which is a proxy for the diversity of products offered and not necessarily the quality of the specific goods sold. According to Ellickson, consumers would be willing to pay higher prices for a larger choice of products. This increase in store-level quality is due to endogenous investments in a process innovation related to the company's computerized inventory system. According to Ellickson, Sutton's model implies that local markets will remain concentrated as market size increases if consumers value larger stores for the greater variety in products offered. Using data for a cross-section of U.S. supermarkets for the year 1998, he finds that store size is positively correlated with population size in local markets even though the number of stores does not change across markets. He argues that if the innovation in the computerized inventory system only lowers cost, it should be reflected in lower prices for a set of products that are sold nationally. When he finds no statistically significant difference in prices across markets and store size, he concludes that consumers must be willing to pay higher prices associated with the greater diversity of products. No controls were included for the possibility that higher quality stores sell a different mix of products of higher quality.
Neoclassical Duration Models
We conclude the review of the literature with an extensive survey of the recent work on inter-firm and intra-firm diffusion of innovations. While the inter-firm diffusion literature considers first adoptions, the intra-firm diffusion literature is more directly related to persistent adoption. The diffusion literature attempts to isolate the factors contributing to the diffusion of specific innovations. Karshenas and Stoneman (1995) provide a detailed survey of the earlier work on inter-firm diffusion, while Battisti and Stoneman (2005) summarize the literature on intra-firm diffusion. The intra-firm literature primarily considers the degree to which a firm uses the innovation at its various outlets. In Section 3 we interpret intra-firm diffusion differently by considering the extent of use of high-speed technology at each ski resort. We argue that, as the extent of use increases at the ski resort, the ski resort's overall level of quality increases. In this way intra-firm diffusion of technology is the same as persistent adoption of a qualityenhancing innovation with implications for increased vertical differentiation.
2.4.1.
Inter-firm Diffusion. This literature implicitly assumes that potential adopters evaluate the costs and benefits of adoption based on their situation relative to that of other potential adopters and to factors such as firm size, availability of alternative technologies, and price. In order to quantify the relationship between the adoption rate and a set of exogenous factors influencing the adoption rate, researchers have generally used parametric duration models assuming hazard functions with negative exponential or Weibull distributions.
Although the Cox Proportional Hazards model was used by Levin, Levin, and Meisel (1987) and Cabral and Leiblein, it is not common in this literature. As suggested by Karshenas and Stoneman (2002) and Allison (2001) , the signs and level of significance of the coefficients should be essentially the same for the Cox model and a properly specified parametric model with a Weibull distribution. While a major advantage of the Cox model is that it places no restriction on the baseline hazard function, a parametric model indicates how the baseline hazard changes over time. Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) , for example, found that the baseline hazard in their case increased over time and argued that this was evidence of an epidemic effect of increased informational flows over time among firms. Researchers generally find that the largest firms are the most likely initial adopters and that the hazard rate exhibits positive duration over time. Other factors influencing the adoption decision have been the price of innovation, the age of the firm, and the number of competitors who have adopted.
Despite their wide-spread use, neoclassical models of diffusion have been subject to attack from researchers favoring an evolutionary approach to diffusion. Metcalfe (1988) provides an earlier survey of this literature. The main criticism rests on the assumption of rational decision-making by fully informed optimizing firms. Following Simon (1972) , some researchers question whether firms are more likely to make adoption decisions based on a rule of thumb or local custom instead of global optimization in competition with other optimizing firms. They also question the assumption of an equilibrium model with firms making adoption decisions when specific thresholds have been reached, such as the size of the firm, price of the innovation, or number of rivals who have adopted. Sarkar (1998) provides a more recent survey of this literature with a comparison to the neoclassical approach. According to Sarkar, evolutionary diffusion advocates have had an impact on recent theoretical neoclassical diffusion models, which have increasingly incorporated expectations and the possibility of continuous innovation. Another contribution of the evolutionary approach is an emphasis on the importance of understanding the exact nature of the innovation's impact on the firm's production process. While we argue in Section 3 that a neoclassical approach to the diffusion of chairlift technology is appropriate, we agree that an understanding of the effect that the technology has on the ski resort's quality of service is essential for explaining both initial and persistent adoption of this technology.
Despite several empirical studies of diffusion, data limitations pose a serious problem. For example, according to Sarkar, "the applicability of duration models has … been … limited … mainly because of limitation of data; to estimate duration models, one ideally needs a data set on complete life histories of the population of potential adopters, as well as the characteristics of a well-defined new technology over a sufficiently long period of time since its inception. Such ideal data sets have been relatively rare, and in particular, disaggregated data on the adoption of new technologies have been scarce" (Sarkar, . As a result, aggregated data are often used that may not reveal the exact nature of the adopting firm's product and the impact that the innovation has on the firm's productivity.
Aggregation can be problematical for an empirical study of persistent adoption if there is no information concerning the nature of improvements in specific innovations over time. A case in point is a recent paper by Bartoloni and Baussola (2001) who use a logit model and cross-section data of adoptions of process and product innovations by Italian manufacturing firms. They regressed a dichotomous variable indicating whether the firms had adopted an innovation during the time period 1990-1992 on various variables, such as firm size, the skill labor of the labor force, marketing expenditures, output growth, and the number of adopting firms in the firm's sector. As is the case for many empirical papers in this literature, the aggregate nature of the data does not permit a determination of causality for any specific innovation or allow for differences in vintages of similar innovations or the firm's history of adoptions. The data also do not reveal whether the innovation is a product or process innovation or a replacement for an earlier innovation.
While the empirical inter-firm diffusion literature generally has relied on aggregate data across broad classes of innovations and vintages, the theoretical literature has focused on the diffusion of individual innovations. Earlier work developed conditions for showing that a diffusion pattern of unequal adoption dates may result even with otherwise identical firms and identical consumers. See for example, Reinganum (1981 and 1983) and Fudenberg and Tirole (1985) . Despite this work there has been little guidance for empirical researchers working with data for firms and consumers that are not a priori identical. Most of the theoretical motivation for individual factors is on a variable-by-variable basis. Both Geroski (2000) and Stoneman (2002) provide surveys of the empirical literature with an emphasis on the expected impact of specific variables.
Recently, Götz (1999) offered a model with a cost-reducing process innovation that makes a clear distinction between the effect of epidemic information spillovers and that of adoptions by competitors on the future adoption rate of non-adopters. He models a monopolistically competitive market with identical consumers having preferences for every variety of a specific good and all firms producing with identical production costs a priori. While the new technology lowers the production costs for any firm that adopts, not all firms adopt at the same time. The diffusion pattern is a function of the number of different varieties of the good, the cross-price elasticities, and the extent of the reduction in the price of the technology over time.
While Götz's model does account for some product differentiation, the model is not directly applicable to time-saving process innovations. For example, there is no explicit role in his model for a time-saving innovation nor does it account for differences in consumers' preferences for service quality related to their opportunity cost of time.
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There is also no role for an innovation changing the degree of differentiation (i.e., changing the cross-price elasticities). In Götz's model increased competition is equivalent to less product differentiation, but the degree of product differentiation is not directly affected by the innovation itself. Since the technology is indivisible, there is also no direct implication for persistence in intra-firm adoption or through adoption of improvements in the technology.
More recently, Mulligan and Llinares (2003) establish another reason for adoption of a process innovation: horizontal differentiation in the services provided by the adopting firms. They find that innovations that increase service speed in the U.S. ski industry result in a different diffusion pattern than previously found in the literature. Mulligan and Llinares argued that innovations in the quality of service, such as service speed, might diffuse differently than innovations directed primarily at cost reduction. They report results concerning the diffusion of detachable chairlifts in the United States that provide the first empirical evidence that the adoption of a technological innovation by a firm decreases the likelihood that a local competitor will also adopt it. They model the effect that an innovation in service speed has on a ski resort's incentive to differentiate the quality of its service relative to that of its competitors and hypothesize that the incentive to adopt is negatively related to the number of competitors who have already adopted.
As mentioned earlier, modification of the technology over time can complicate the use of duration models that implicitly assume that the underlying technology remains homogenous. Mulligan and Llinares avoid this problem by using chairlift technology, because there has been little change over time. The main difference has been in the cost of making the chairlifts, while the underlying characteristics have remained essentially the same. Their paper provides the starting point for the extended example of persistent adoption presented in Section 3.
Consumer willingness to pay higher prices in exchange for faster service is not new to the economics literature. For example, it is an important part of Davidson's (1988) duopoly queuing model with each firm offering service at different speeds and at different prices. The relative technological benefits of using service units of differing speed and number are also a part of earlier work by Mulligan [1983 and . While the change in speed creates a different quality of service that may appeal to all consumers, there is a limit to the number of consumers who value this higher quality of service enough either to pay relatively higher prices or incur greater travel costs.
Although modifications in technology over time create problems for duration analysis in general, there is also a problem that is peculiar to innovations that affect service time. In a working paper, Das and Mulligan (2004), we argued that the underlying technology could even change in significant enough ways to create a different diffusion pattern for each vintage of the innovation. Lumping vintages together can confound the analysis of the diffusion process. While cost-saving innovations may be apparent to consumers indirectly through lower prices, innovations in service quality are more directly obvious to them and may lead to more horizontal differentiation at least during the initial stages of the diffusion process.
We reported estimates from non-parametric and parametric duration models showing that the first vintages of optical scanners installed in supermarkets in the U.S. from 1974 to 1985 had a similar impact on service speed and followed a similar diffusion pattern to that of detachable chairlifts. Our results go beyond providing additional evidence of the product differentiation effect of time-saving technological innovations. In an earlier study, Levin, Levin, and Meisel (1987) considered a shorter diffusion time period and did not reach the same conclusions as we did. While we are able to reproduce their main results using their estimation procedure and comparable explanatory variables for their time period of analysis, the difference in our conclusions stems from our controlling for vintage effects.
The main features of the first vintages of optical scanner systems were faster processing of customer purchases and an itemized receipt. NCR released the first scanner system in June of 1974 with IBM providing a comparable system soon afterwards. The first scanning system technology, however, was prone to errors. The scanner would often not scan an item even after three tries requiring the checkout clerk to key in the price manually. Vintage 1 also had only one laser beam to read bar codes.
The first significant improvement (vintage 2) appeared in November 1979, when IBM released Model 3667, which increased service speed of the checkout process by allowing the scanner to read much smaller bar codes.
3 Vintage 2 had more laser beams and more accurate readings. The second vintage, however, diffused only between November 1979 and November 1980 before being replaced by the third vintage (IBM Model 3687), which diffused beyond the end of our sample period in March 1985. With vintage 3 the proportion of inaccurate readings decreased significantly. Vintage 3 was the first to use a holographic technique to reduce the handling of the items by the checkout clerks (Fistell, 35) . It could also read bar codes that were damaged and read bar codes on items such as frozen meat (even if the bar code became crinkled and wet). All of these improvements led to faster processing time. 4 The main point of this paper was that accounting for the unique characteristics of different vintages of an innovation is important, because these vintages may follow different diffusion patterns. While the third vintage increased the scanner's capacity to read ever smaller bar codes resulting in decreased processing time, by this time firms were able to take advantage of the cost-saving potential associated with hiring fewer workers needed to mark prices on individual items and with improvements in software used by the store processor. While processing speed did improve with subsequent vintages, the marginal improvement in service speed decreased significantly as the pace of improvements in processor capacity and software accelerated.
As noted earlier, Hannan and McDowell and Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) attributed the positive effect of prior adoptions on the rate of diffusion to an epidemic flow of information to potential adopters. As shown by Götz, a decrease in the price of a purely cost-reducing innovation and an increase in the stock of adopters increases the adoption rate for reasons that are unrelated to an epidemic spread of information.
5 Given that the main effect of the initial vintages of optical scanner technology was on service speed, we hypothesized and found that adoptions by competitors lowered the adoption rate in the same way reported by Mulligan and Llinares. As cost reduction became more important with subsequent vintages, this effect diminished.
Differences across vintages were not limited to prior adoptions by competitors. Given the effect of optical scanners on consumer time costs and an assumed relationship between income and the opportunity cost of time, we expected and found that the first vintage diffused more quickly in markets with higher household income. On the other hand, we expected that the coefficient for household effective buyer income becomes less important or even changes sign for later vintages that lowered costs, given relatively lower-income consumers' sensitivity to price. Anecdotal evidence at the time suggested that scanners were first installed in stores in relatively wealthier urban resorts with only 29% of all stores having scanners by 1985. We also included a variable not normally found in the literature as another control for the opportunity cost of time: average household size. Having controlled for per-capita income, we considered larger household size as a proxy for the time costs of the person doing the shopping. As in the case of percapita income, we expected and found this variable to be positively correlated with the diffusion of the time-saving first vintage but less so with subsequent vintages. Götz's model suggests a faster diffusion for a cost-reducing innovation in competitive markets where increased competition is defined as less product differentiation. According to his model, greater competition forces firms to lower costs on the margin in order to remain competitive. On the other hand, there is ambiguity in the empirical literature about the impact of other measures of competition, such as the fourfirm seller concentration ratio. 6 In our study we used a measure of the four-firm seller concentration ratio as our indicator of the degree of competition. While measures such as the four-firm seller concentration ratio are not exactly what is implied by Götz's measure of competition, we expected and found that more competitive markets are likely to diffuse the third vintage faster than the first one due to the pressure that competition has on pricing and the impact of the innovation on the firm's costs. On the other hand, Mulligan and Llinares argued that the number of competitors captures another aspect of the product differentiation effect, since a firm may adopt an innovation to differentiate the quality of its service before its rivals adopt the innovation. While the four-firm seller concentration ratio is to some extent negatively correlated with the number of competitors, Mulligan and Llinares argue that the more competitors a company has the more room it has for differentiating its service from that of competitors. We expected and found this variable to be positively related to the adoption probability.
While the theoretical literature focuses on establishing the possibility of a diffusion pattern for identical firms, Götz does incorporate a firm size variable in his model and shows that larger firms diffuse the innovation more rapidly as long as the technology is indivisible (that is, independent of firm size). The empirical literature hypothesizes the same relationship for essentially the same reason attributing it to scale economies. Even though anecdotal evidence suggests a potential scale economy at the store level given the need for a central processor for at least the third vintage, we did not have a direct measure of store size. While we did have data for the average store size per SMSA, we do not have this information on a per-store or per-company basis.
Most empirical studies in this literature find that the incentive to adopt the innovation increases with other less direct measures of firm size, such as firm market share.
7 In our case, we included both firm market share and a second possible control for firm size: whether or not the company is a large supermarket chain. While anecdotal evidence suggests that scale economies start to become more important for companies at the SMSA level after 1980 and especially after 1985 due to increased capacity for the store processor and software development linking scanner data from a chain's stores in a specific SMSA, the full potential at the SMSA level was still in the earliest stages of development by the beginning of 1985. On the other hand, since greater access to financing for a new and unproven technology may be a factor in explaining adoption of the technology, we hypothesized that these variables may have been factors in explaining the diffusion of at least the first vintage of this technology.
Anecdotal evidence also suggests that some stores may have reduced labor costs by reducing the number of cashiers.
8 While we did not have adequate data on labor costs or the number of cashiers per store for the entire time period of the study, we did have data on the average number of square feet per number of checkouts in the SMSA at the start of each time period under investigation. Since stores with more square feet per checkout may be economizing on relatively higher labor costs, we expected and found this variable to be positively correlated with the rate of diffusion.
Saving costs by eliminating the need for marking prices on packages was also an initial expectation in the industry, but consumer resistance delayed the realization of these benefits. Anecdotal evidence suggests that this resistance did not persist throughout the time period. According to the March 27, 1978 article, "Just 208 stores, considerably less than 1 percent of the country's 33,000 supermarkets, have so far been equipped with registers that can read the [Universal Product] code. Now, however, several years behind schedule this revolution in grocery retailing is gathering momentum. The Retail Clerks International Union, which had feared that scanners would be bad for employment, has reconsidered the evidence on that point and retreated to a posture of neutrality. Labor's allies in the consumer movement have also quieted down-perhaps because the consumers they presume to speak for have fallen in love with scanners" (Coyle, 76) .
Despite growing acceptance of scanners, six states (California, Michigan, New York, Connecticut, Massachusetts, and Rhode Island) passed laws by 1976, still in effect, requiring that supermarkets with scanners place prices on each item as a consumer protection initiative. To test the impact of this law we included a dichotomous variable for the six states that passed laws requiring stores to mark prices on individual items. We find that these laws had no effect on the adoption of scanners during the diffusion of the first vintage, since consumer resistance in all states during this time period made such laws redundant. However, we expected and found that these state laws had a negative impact on the diffusion rate of the third vintage.
We also accounted for possible persistent adoption by estimating the model with two additional variables controlling for adoption decisions concerning earlier vintages of the technology both for the company and for its competitors. Including these variables does not change the sign or the level of statistical significance of the coefficients of any of the other covariates. While the incentive to adopt decreases with prior adoptions of vintage 3 by rivals, it increases with the number of rival companies that adopted vintage 1 or vintage 2 and whether the company itself had adopted one of the earlier two vintages. These results are consistent with persistence of the incentive to differentiate a store's quality of service relative to that of its competitors.
While we find that none of the covariates affecting the adoption decisions of these vintages lose their predictive power when control variables are added for adoptions of other vintages, decisions concerning the adoption of later vintages are affected by the firm's and its rivals' decisions concerning earlier vintages. In particular, we find no evidence that supermarket chains waited for the second or third vintage of the technology before making their first adoptions. Firms adopting the first vintage of the technology were more likely to adopt the subsequent vintages, and symmetrically those firms adopting the later vintages were more likely to have adopted an earlier vintage. Interestingly, firms adopting later vintages were less likely to do so if their competitors had adopted the later vintage, but were more likely to adopt the later vintage if their competitors had adopted an earlier vintage. We suggest that these results are consistent with our overall hypothesis that firms may persist in adopting subsequent vintages of time-saving process innovations if it allows them at least for some time to differentiate their service from that of their competitors.
After March 1985 information on adoptions of scanning technology was no longer provided by the trade publications even though less than a third of the approximately 30,000 stores in the United States had scanners at that time. While we are unable to analyze formally what happened after March 1985, anecdotal evidence suggests that the pace of adoption increased dramatically primarily due to rapid expansion in store processor capacity and development of more advanced software. For example, by July 1994 25,000 supermarkets were using scanners at that time representing 95 percent of chain stores and 75 percent of independent supermarkets. After 1985, marginal improvements in scanning speed were minimal compared to purely cost-saving improvements.
As this extended example illustrates, innovations can have effects that vary considerably from one vintage to the next. While not all innovations are subject to this problem, this example suggests that detailed knowledge of the effect that an innovation has on the production process is an important starting point for an empirical study of the diffusion process. Studies that rely on aggregated data that may mask the impact of specific innovations are thus subject to questions about their applicability. We now turn to intra-firm diffusion, where the aggregation problem can be especially serious.
Intra-firm diffusion.
In their recent paper Battisti and Stoneman state that "the study of intra-firm diffusion has largely been neglected and the limited extant literature overwhelmingly relies upon uncertainty reduction via information spreading or epidemic learning as the main driver." For example, this literature gives particular importance to a variable, originally proposed by Mansfield (1963) , measuring the time since initial adoption of the technology as a proxy of information flow within the company. Despite the common finding in this literature that the extent of use of a specific technology increases with the number of years since first adoption, Battisti and Stoneman find no evidence of this with their data.
Battisti and Stoneman adapt the approach taken by Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) for inter-firm diffusion to a study of intra-firm adoptions of computer numerically controlled technology (CNC) at firms in the UK engineering and metalworking sectors. Battisti and Stoneman base their approach on the assumption that firms will gain differently from using more of a specific technology due to differences across firms. The value of additional amounts of the technology will also depend on the level or the stock of the technology already used by the firm. Given the cost of the technology, not all firms will adopt the same level of the technology at a point in time. Battisti and Stoneman apply this logic to an equilibrium model with firms deciding whether or not to add to their capital stock over time.
In their empirical work the dependent variable is the log of the ratio of the machine-tool stock of the firm incorporating CNC technology in 1993 to that not using CNC technology. The independent variables include measures of firm size (employees), current and expected user costs, years in business, use of in-house R and D, use of complementary technologies, and two proxies for epidemic effects: log years from the firm's first adoption of CNC technology up to 1993 and log of the within-industry share of adopters at the time of the firm's first adoption. Expectations of future price changes are based on adaptive expectations using historical changes in prices. The industry is defined as all firms producing the majority of their products in the same three-digit (and in some cases, four-digit) SIC code industry. As generally found in the inter-firm diffusion literature, firm size is correlated with adoption. They find no support for an epidemic effect due to information spreading or learning effects as measured by their two proxies. In their case, the percentage of firms adopting in the same three-digit SIC industry and the time since first adoption do not have an effect on the firm's own extent of adoption.
As was the case for Bartoloni and Baussola, aggregation poses a problem for Battisti and Stoneman. Since the CNC technology first appeared in 1970, it should have undergone several changes by 1993. Although acknowledging that changes in the technology could affect the diffusion pattern, they do not have information about the various vintages of the technology or how the different firms in their sample use the technology. Battisti and Stoneman implicitly assume that firms within the three-digit industries are essentially producing the same kinds of products and are direct competitors. However, in their sample only one of 343 firms had 100 percent usage by 1993, while 59 were excluded from their initial sample for considering the technology inappropriate for their production process. By 1993 the proportion of the machine tool stock of the plant using CNC was less than 20 percent for slightly more than 50 percent of the firms with only 7 percent with a proportion over 70 percent. It is not clear from their paper whether or not these proportions differ significantly by SIC code or whether adopting firms produce some of the same products as the 59 firms that do not use CNC technology at all. As a result, we do not know if all the firms would ever adopt the technology at a 100 percent rate or if they had already reached their theoretical upper limit by 1993. In other words, it is not clear if the adoption rate is actually a proxy for the mix of products produced in these three-digit SIC industries.
Earlier papers on intra-firm diffusion that relied on less aggregated data are subject to a similar criticism. For example, Levin, Levin, and Meisel (1992) estimated a model of intra-firm diffusion using data from their previous study Levin, Levin, and Meisel (1987) on inter-firm diffusion of point-of-sale optical scanners. Following Mansfield, they attributed the intra-firm diffusion pattern to an epidemic learning effect within the firm. As shown in Das and Mulligan (2004) , Levin, Levin, and Meisel (1987) estimated their inter-firm duration model implicitly assuming that the technology was homogeneous even though their time period includes the diffusion of three different vintages. Levin, Levin, and Meisel (1987) treated each adoption by the firm as an additional adoption of the original technology, while some of these adoptions were actually upgrades or replacements. Since they used the same data, Levin, Levin, and Meisel (1992) did not know the ratio of a company's stores that had actually converted to optical scanners at any point in time.
Summary
The literature reviewed to this point contains a wide range of theoretical models and empirical examples showing how firms may have an incentive to persist in the adoption of new technologies given assumptions about the learning process associated with specific technologies and across vintages, expectations about future prices and the extent and timing of improvements in quality, and adoption decisions by rivals. We emphasized the importance of knowing how the innovation actually affects the firm's production process. While there is a theoretical literature that considers the diffusion pattern of specific innovations, most empirical studies rely on aggregate data that can mask the impact of the innovation on the firm's production process. This problem can be especially serious for time-saving innovations, since the nature of the diffusion process may change as the technology evolves over time. Our earlier work on optical scanners is a case in point.
In the next section we turn to another innovation that increases service speed: high-speed chairlift technology. Unlike optical scanners and most of the innovations studied in the literature, chairlift technology has not undergone continuous improvement. Improvements in the technology have been limited to an increase the number of seats per chairlift from four to six. As a result, persistence in this case takes the form of an increasing percentage of chairs using the technology at any one ski resort. Unlike the main focus of papers on intra-firm diffusion of technology, such as scanners or ATMs where diffusion means converting a firm's additional stores or banks to the technology, adding another high-speed chairlift affects everyone at the ski resort. In this sense intrafirm diffusion results in an increase in quality of service as the number of chairlifts increases at the ski resort. The impact of intra-firm diffusion on vertical quality differentiation plays an important role in our description of the nature of competition in this industry.
HIGH-SPEED DETACHABLE CHAIRLIFTS
In this section we consider persistent adoption of high-speed chairlift technology in the U.S. ski industry. We expand on earlier work by Mulligan and Llinares concerning the inter-firm diffusion of this technology from 1981 to 1997. In Section 3.1, we summarize Mulligan and Llinares' main results. As mentioned earlier, they reported estimates of a parametric diffusion model consistent with the hypothesis that the incentive to adopt high-speed detachable chairlifts decreases as other local ski resorts adopt. By contrast, the empirical literature generally finds that regardless of the nature of the innovation, the rate of adoption is an increasing function of prior adoptions by local competitors. Our main focus, however, is the likelihood of persistent adoption of highspeed technology after the initial adoption. In Section 3.2 we provide empirical support for persistent adoption at ski resorts that cater primarily to avid and vacation skiers.
First Adoptions
In an earlier model of lift ticket pricing with homogeneous chairlift technology, Barro and Romer (1987) made a distinction between avid and other skiers based on a skier's willingness to pay for additional runs per day. They hypothesized that some ski resorts would specialize in avid skiers by charging higher prices leading to less congestion and more runs per skier per day.
Mulligan and Llinares argue that the high-speed detachable chairlift technology provides an additional means of creating more runs per day for avid and vacation skiers. The detachable chairlift offers skiers features not provided by the older fixed-grip technology, such as easier loading, a potentially more exciting ride, somewhat fewer loading and unloading incidents, and somewhat higher actual (as opposed to design) capacity due to lower frequency of breakdowns, while reducing the time needed to go to the top of the hill by approximately one-half.
9 While these characteristics may appeal to many skiers, Mulligan and Llinares reported that only 68 of over 400 U.S. ski resorts had installed a detachable chairlift by 1997. By 2005 this number had increased to 99. A major deterrent to adoption is the cost, since the detachable chairlift has remained approximately 40 percent more expensive per unit of capacity relative to the older technology.
10
Because of the cost increase, models focusing on cost-reducing process innovations are unable to explain the diffusion of this type of technology. As additional ski resorts adopt detachable chairlifts to attract skiers willing to pay higher prices for these chairlifts' special features and the additional runs per day, late adopters must share this submarket with those that have already adopted. With a continuum of skier types the adopting ski resorts would have to lower their prices in order to attract relatively less avid skiers as the number of adopters increases. Given the relatively smaller number of skiers placing a high value on lift speed in local markets and the relatively high cost of the chairlift, the incentive to adopt is likely to decrease as other local ski resorts adopt.
To test this hypothesis Mulligan and Llinares estimated a parametric duration model using annual data for 344 ski resorts having at least one chairlift from the 1980-1981 to 1996-1997 ski seasons for the following exogenous variables: whether or not the ski resort started business after 1970, whether or not the ski resort is on U.S. Forest Land, vertical drop, the number of potentially skiable acres, the number of competitors within 125 miles of the ski resort, and number of adopters within 125 miles of the ski resort at time t-1.
Given that new ski resorts have generally added chairlifts in stages over time, they conjectured and found that the newest ski resorts would be more likely to add chairlifts of any type in a given year. They used a dichotomous variable indicating whether or not the ski resort started business after 1970 and also re-estimated the model with similar results using the actual establishment date. The median initial date of operation was 1958.
Ski resorts on National Forest land generally have lower costs, because the rental prices for use of the land have not reflected market prices. On the other hand, they face constraints concerning parking and hotel rooms that other ski resorts do not face, because of their remote locations and restrictions imposed by the U.S. Forest Service. Specializing in a smaller number of avid skiers may result in less congestion of these related facilities and provide them an additional incentive to adopt the detachable chairlift. While only 32.8 percent of ski resorts in the sample were located on land operated by the U.S. Forest Service, Mulligan and Llinares found that these ski resorts were more likely to make initial adoptions, ceteris paribus.
Mulligan and Llinares used vertical drop as a control for both the size of the ski resort and the expected increase in demand during this time period. Ski resorts with higher vertical drops may also have an incentive to adopt the detachable chairlift due to scale economies.
11 Although the number of skier days has remained relatively constant in the U.S. throughout this time period, skiers are skiing more during extended vacation periods at ski resorts with larger vertical drops. These are also the ski resorts most likely to be competing with the largest ski resorts in the U.S. and the rest of the world for the avid skier. As a result, ski resorts with larger vertical drops were more likely to make an initial adoption. In the next section we find the same result for the proportion of highspeed chairlifts.
While ski resorts have some flexibility in increasing their lift capacity and skiable acres at the beginning of the ski season, they will eventually face a binding limit on skiable terrain. At higher lift capacity to potentially skiable acre ratios, skiers face a relatively greater degree of congestion that limits the number of ski runs. Since lift capacity in any given year is endogenous, they did not include lift capacity in the estimation. Mulligan and Llinares hypothesized and found that ski resorts with more potentially skiable acres will be more likely to add a chairlift regardless of its speed. Since there is no direct exogenous measure of potentially skiable acres available, they used actual skiable acres in the year 2000 as their proxy for this variable and terminated the sample period at the end of the 1996-1997 ski season. In the next section we find that skiable acreage is also an important factor limiting the persistence of high-speed chairlifts at all but the largest ski resorts.
Due to a lack of data on skier visits and skier types at specific ski resorts, Mulligan and Llinares were unable to determine the number of skiers or the distribution of skier types per local market. They argued, however, that ski resorts with a larger number of competitors charge higher lift ticket prices, ceteris paribus, likely due to higher demand per ski resort. Since ski resorts catering to avid skiers in the Barro-Romer model charge higher prices even in the absence of faster chairlifts, the higher prices could also indicate a higher concentration of relatively avid skiers in these local markets. As a result, Mulligan and Llinares hypothesized that an increased number of competitors, ceteris paribus, provides a greater incentive for any ski resort to adopt the faster chairlift in order to differentiate its service relative to that of its competitors. They defined this variable as the number of ski resorts located within 125 miles of driving distance from the ski resort and also estimated the model with local competitors defined as all ski resorts within 50 miles of the ski resort.
12 They defined the number of adopters as all ski resorts within 125 miles of the ski resort that had installed at least one high-speed detachable chairlift by the end of the previous ski season. They also estimated the model using 50 miles in place of 125 miles.
Mulligan and Llinares also found that the hazard function exhibited the property of positive duration dependence generally found in the literature. Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) argued that by allowing the hazard rate to vary over time, one provides a better test of the effect of prior adoptions by competitors than that of earlier studies that had restricted the distribution of the hazard function. While they also found positive duration dependence for some of the industries in their sample, there was an absence of a deterrent effect of the number of prior adoptions on a firm's adoption rate. Karshenas and Stoneman justify this finding by making an analogy to the spread of epidemics based on "(i) the learning processes involved in the use of new technology and its transmission through human contact, with the "infection" being information; (ii) pressure of social emulation and competition; or (iii) reductions in uncertainty resulting from extensions of use" (p. 509).
Mulligan and Llinares believed that positive duration dependence for the ski industry is due to a different reason. When the detachable chairlift was introduced in 1981, there were several articles about the new technology in the trade literature, and the technology had already been in use at European ski resorts. As a result, it is unlikely that a lack of information alone, at least among ski resorts, could explain the positive duration dependence. There is evidence to suggest that changes in skier opportunity costs of time during the 1980s and 1990s encouraged ski resorts to increase overall capacity in order to shorten lift lines and increase the potential number of runs per skier per day. For example, although the number of skier days at U.S. ski resorts remained relatively constant at approximately 50 million per year between 1980 and 1997, overall lift capacity in the industry increased by approximately 70 percent. Lift ticket prices increased by 154.69 percent on non-holiday weekdays and 148.86 percent on holidays and weekends during this time period, while the CPI increased by only 78.4 percent. In addition, the nominal price of both fixed-grip and high-speed detachable chairlifts remained essentially unchanged during this time period.
Willingness of skiers to pay even higher lift ticket prices, ceteris paribus, at ski resorts with detachable chairlifts, especially during off-peak time periods, suggests that increases in the opportunity costs over time have resulted in an increased demand for more runs per day. While only 5 percent of the U.S. population goes skiing at least once each year, skiers are among the wealthiest Americans. In 1996 average skier household income was more than $80,000 with the share of skier households with income under $50,000 only 27 percent (Cravatta, 1997). By comparison, median U.S. household income was only $35,000 in 1996. Since 1980, the biggest increases in income were received by the upper fifth of the income distribution.
13 Given no change in skier days per year, the increase in overall capacity has increased the potential number of runs per skier-day for all skiers. Since a detachable chairlift can result in even more runs per day with the same capacity as that of the older technology, the empirical results are consistent with the overall increased demand for more runs per day in the industry as a whole.
Since Mulligan and Llinares' main focus was the effect of local competitors on the adoption decision, the definition of the local market was a concern. For example, the distances between clusters of Western and Rocky Mountain ski resorts are more pronounced than in other regions. When the market resort includes all ski resorts within 125 miles of one another, there is little overlap of local markets in the Western and Rocky Mountain regions.
14 This is not the case elsewhere. For example, all ski resorts in New Hampshire share the same competitors within New Hampshire, yet those located in the Northeastern part of the state have competitors in Maine within 125 miles, while those in the Southwestern part have local competitors in Vermont and Massachusetts. Despite these differences, Mulligan and Llinares report results showing that the coefficients for the number of local competitors and number of local adopters variables are statistically significant with the same predicted signs for the Eastern, Western and Rocky Mountain regions.
Another potential problem in the estimation of diffusion models is the case of simultaneous adoptions. Mulligan and Llinares assumed that adoptions are made without knowledge of the intentions of one's competitors, which is also Hannan and McDowell's and Levin, Levin, and Meisel's maintained assumption. By contrast, Karshenas and Stoneman (1993) assumed that firms knew whether or not their competitors would also adopt at time t and t + 1. This approach, however, amounts to assuming perfect foresight and ignores the strategic interaction among competitors. Karshenas and Stoneman justify this approach by stating that while it "does not fully reflect the strategic nature of some of the recent [theoretical] contributions, ... , the theoretical literature gives no indication of what might be a more adequate empirical approach" (p. 507).
Simultaneous adoptions were a potential problem given that 28 of the 68 ski resorts in the sample adopted in the same year as at least one other local competitor. Given that some of the ski resorts may have known of the binding intention by local competitors to adopt, Mulligan and Llinares also estimated the model based on the extreme assumption that every ski resort knew whether or not its competitors were going to install a detachable chairlift prior to making its own decision. The coefficient for prior adopters remains positive and statistically significant for the Eastern ski resorts at the five percent level and for the entire sample at the ten percent level.
While the coefficients for the number of prior adopters are still positive for the Rocky Mountain and Western regions, they are no longer statistically significant. One possible interpretation is that these ski resorts are less concerned about the adoption decisions of their local competitors and are only concerned about the national and international market. However, even if some of the ski resorts knew in advance of binding commitments by competitors to add a faster ski lift, not all of the ski resorts could have had this information. Even assuming that everyone knew everyone else's intentions, there was still no support for the alternative hypothesis of an epidemic effect due to the adoption decisions of one's most immediate competitors. In the next subsection we present evidence to suggest that these ski resorts do follow a different pattern of persistent adoption compared to those with a primarily local clientele. However, we also reject the possibility of an epidemic informational effect.
Mulligan and Llinares report that a large number of small ski resorts left the industry between 1980 and 1997, while 26 ski resorts entered. Six of the entrants eventually installed a detachable chairlift. While duration models control for right-hand censoring associated with some non-adopters still in the sample at the end of the sample period, there is no direct method for controlling for left-hand censoring. Mulligan and Llinares reported results including these 26 ski resorts, because all of the exogenous variables are either site specific (vertical drop, location on National Forest land, and potentially skiable acres) or competitor specific (number of competitors and number of prior adopters). None of the entrants rented U.S. Forest land. Given that someone could have used these lands as ski resorts at any point during this time period, the decision to add a detachable chairlift is essentially the same as that faced by an existing ski resort. They also estimated the model without these 26 ski resorts with no significant change in the estimated coefficients.
No ski resort with a vertical drop below 500 feet or fewer than 75 skiable acres installed a detachable chairlift during this time period. As a further test, they estimated the model excluding the 122 ski resorts with less than 500 vertical feet and 75 skiable acres with essentially identical results for the number of prior adopters and local competitors.
Persistent Adoption
Since Mulligan and Llinares did not consider the persistence of adoption either within firms or across vintages of high-speed technology, we now investigate the extent to which individual ski resorts have altered the mix of chairlifts using high-speed technology since 1981. While the technology was first used for chairlifts with four seats (HS quads), more recently manufacturers have added high-speed chairlifts with six seats (HS six-packs). Although there is a wide array of technology in use from rope tows and J-bars to gondolas and trams even at the same ski resort, we concentrate in this section on the proportion of chairs using high-speed technology. This comparison is likely to understate the extent of use of the technology given that we do not control for the vertical drop covered by each type of technology. While this information is available for some ski resorts, it is not generally provided. We assume that surface lifts are designed for short vertical drops and beginners and are thus not likely to be converted to high-speed technology. Table 1 shows the number of ski resorts by state that have adopted at least one high-speed chairlift by 2005. As reported by Mulligan and Llinares, 27 of 72 ski resorts in the Rocky Mountain states and 17 of the 58 Western ski resorts had adopted by 1997, compared to only 21 of the 115 Eastern ski resorts and 3 of the 87 ski resorts in the North Central region. By 2005 the number of initial adopters increased to 32 in the East (of which 20 were in the three Northern New England states), 9 in the North Central region, 33 in the Rocky Mountain region, and 23 in the Western region.
One possible form of persistent adoption concerns the types of chairlifts used at a ski resort. The main innovation in chairlift technology since 1981 is an increase in the number of seats from four (HS quad) to six (HS six-pack). Table 2 provides a crosstabulation of ski resorts based on the numbers of high-speed quads and six-packs. 234 of the 333 ski resorts having at least one chairlift in 2005 did not use high-speed technology. Eight of the nineteen ski resorts with HS 6-packs did not have any HS quads. In addition, nineteen of the thirty HS 6-packs were located at ski resorts with at most one HS quad, while the number of HS quads per ski resorts ranged to a maximum of fourteen. We interpret this information to mean that the adoption of the HS 6-pack technology was unlikely to represent persistence in adoption of new technology distinctly different from that of HS quads. In other words, given the large percentage of first-time adopters of high-speed technology choosing HS 6-packs, it appears that prior familiarity with HS quads is not motivating the adoption decision.
As a result, we measure persistence as the proportion of chairs using high-speed technology regardless of the mix between HS quads and six-packs. Our approach has similarities to that of Battisti and Stoneman who used the ratio of machines with CNC technology to those without it. In our case we use the proportion of chairs that incorporate the high-speed technology. We measure this variable in two ways. First, we use a simple proportion of chairs. Second, we double the number of chairs both in the numerator and denominator using high-speed technology. The motivation for this adjustment comes from the earlier discussion concerning the capacity equivalence of high-speed and fixed-grip technology. The HS detachable chairlift moves at approximately twice the speed of the fixed-grip technology. As a result, a HS quad has the equivalent capacity of two fixed-grip quads in terms of number of skiers transported per time period. This second is, therefore, a more accurate measure of the proportion of chairlift capacity using high-speed technology. In the following tables we report only those results for the second measure of persistence. In our regression analysis, we find that the signs and statistical significance of the coefficients are the same in all cases. Table 3 shows the number of ski resorts and minimum, maximum, mean and standard deviation for the second measure of persistence for the 99 ski resorts with at least one high-speed chairlift in 2005. The table also shows this information for each of five regions. For example, while the mean value for the Rocky Mountain ski resorts is 63 percent, the national average is 53 percent. Ski resorts in the Western States (Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, and Nevada) have a mean value of 56 percent. The North-central ski resorts, on the other hand, have a mean value of only 39 percent. Table 4 shows persistence as the sum of chairlifts multiplied by the number of seats per ski resort for each of six regions of the country. Of the 99 ski resorts, 31 have only one HS quad, while 7 have only a HS 6-pack. The remaining 61 ski resorts have more than one high-speed chairlift. While 22 ski resorts in the North-Central and Eastern (excluding Northern New England) Regions had adopted at least one high-speed chairlift by 2005, only 5 had two and one had three. In the Northern New England Region 11 of 20 ski resorts had more than one high-speed chairlift, while 27 of 33 ski resorts in the Rocky Mountain region and 17 of 23 in the Western Region had more than one highspeed chairlift.
In the literature review we noted that the number of years since first adoption has been used as a proxy for internal informational flows on the extent of intra-firm diffusion of an innovation. For example, this variable was used by Battisti and Stoneman in their study of CNC technology. Following Mansfield researchers have attributed a positive correlation between the extent of intra-firm diffusion and time since adoption as evidence of an epidemic effect of information. In Table 5 we present OLS regression results that also find a correlation between the proportion of HS chairs as the dependent variable and the year of first adoption. The other independent variables are vertical drop, average annual snowfall, number of skiable acres, and location on national forest land. In addition to year of adoption, which is statistically significant at the 5 percent level, vertical drop is the only other variable that is statistically significant.
While following Mulligan and Llinares one can make an argument for the exogeneity of the other variables, the year of initial adoption is endogenous and highly correlated with vertical drop. As Mulligan and Llinares report, vertical drop is a major determinant of the year of initial adoption. In addition, since it is not clear that ski resorts would need several years to learn about the usefulness of high-speed technology before adding more chairlifts, the usual argument of an epidemic effect given in the literature seems unwarranted. When a ski resort adds an additional high-speed chairlift, there is an increase in quality available to all the skiers not just to additional consumers unaffected by a firm's initial adoption of the innovation at a different location. Table 5 also provides results with year since adoption excluded. In this case vertical drop increases in significance, while no other regressor has a statistically significant coefficient.
Mulligan and Llinares argued that vertical drop is a proxy for the overall quality of the services provided by the ski resort, increases in demand over time and scale economies for high-speed chairlifts. Ski resorts that cater primarily to a local or regional submarket are less likely to have large vertical drops. In addition, differences in vertical drop for these ski resorts are unlikely to be large enough to explain persistence across local markets. To illustrate this point we make a distinction among ski resorts depending on their locations. Table 6 shows that for states located either in the Western Region (Alaska, Washington, Oregon, California, Arizona, and Nevada) or the Rocky Mountain Region (Utah, Montana, Idaho, Colorado, Wyoming and New Mexico) the only factor affecting the degree of persistence is vertical drop as was the case of the entire sample. However, the coefficient for vertical drop is not statistically significant for the 44 ski resorts in the remaining states where vertical drops are much smaller. Table 6 also includes regression results for all ski resorts except the fifteen located in Colorado that had adopted at least one high-speed chairlift by 2005. These ski resorts have the largest vertical drops and a high degree of persistent adoption. Interestingly, for the remaining 84 ski resorts skiable acres is now the dominant factor determining the extent of persistent adoption.
Taken as a whole the econometric results suggest that a subset of U.S. ski resorts was particularly well suited to serve as a national market for avid and vacation skiers. Several factors, such as skiable acreage, annual snowfall and location on National Forest land, are highly correlated with vertical drop. All of these factors are site specific and indicators of quality. Nearly all of the ski resorts in the national submarket already existed when the first high-speed detachable chairlift was installed at Breckenridge, Colorado in 1981. As a result, ski resorts located in the Rocky Mountain and Western regions were especially well situated to benefit from the increase in demand for skiing due to falling real transportation costs and higher real incomes. Given the relatively higher vertical drops in the Western and Rocky Mountain regions, the greatest extent on persistent adoption occurs in these resorts.
CONCLUSION
In this chapter we considered an extensive literature related to the adoption of process innovations. Despite a wide range of theoretical models with different assumptions and conclusions, empirical diffusion studies of specific innovations have been limited for two main reasons. Data are often aggregated across firms and innovations without providing sufficient detail of the nature of the impact of the innovation on the firm's production process. A second related problem concerns the possibility that the innovation could undergo constant modification during the diffusion process making it difficult to distinguish between diffusion of the basic technology and persistent adoption of improvements. Both problems can be especially important for an empirical study of persistent adoption.
We illustrated the second problem with a detailed example from an earlier working paper showing how the nature of the diffusion process for point-of-sale optical scanners can change substantially from vintage to vintage. By lumping these different vintages together, one provides a misleading interpretation of the diffusion process and the impact of important covariates, such as the number of prior adopters, consumer income and family size, and the degree of competition.
We also provided new evidence for the persistent adoption of high-speed chairlift technology that avoids both problems. Unlike optical scanners and most other innovations, chairlift technology has not undergone significant change since its introduction in the U.S. in 1981. The main improvement has been in the cost of making the lifts with competition keeping the nominal price relatively unchanged during this time period. The performance characteristics of high-speed chairlift technology were also well known to the ski industry at the time of the first adoption mitigating concerns voiced in the evolutionary diffusion literature that potential adopters are not sufficiently well informed or capable of optimizing in a manner assumed by neoclassical diffusion models. Despite twenty-four years of diffusion within the U.S. ski industry, only 99 of over 300 ski resorts with at least one chairlift have adopted this technology by 2005. A study by Mulligan and Llinares has shown that initial adoptions of this technology slowed down the rate of initial adoption by local competitors as early adopters attracted a subgroup of relatively avid skiers willing to pay higher lift-ticket prices.
The ski industry also has a somewhat unique structure that it shares with other recreational and entertainment industries due to the presence of both local/regional and national/international submarkets. We argue in this chapter that these two markets are not likely to provide the same level of service quality due to greater heterogeneity in the mix of skiers at local ski resorts. Although Mulligan and Llinares found that ski resorts in regions that cater primarily to vacation skiers made initial adoptions in a manner similar to that elsewhere, we expect to see and find a higher proportion of high-speed technology at national ski resorts persisting in their adoption of the technology over time. The national market is likely to attract vacation and avid skiers willing to pay for a higher quality skiing experience. While ski resort quality has several dimensions, we have given prominence to vertical drop and skiable acreage as proxies for quality that distinguishes national ski resorts from local ones.
Our empirical results also relate to an on-going discussion in the literature concerning the importance of epidemic informational effects on intra-firm diffusion of technology. Most papers in this literature find that the diffusion rate is an increasing function of the time since the initial adoption of the technology. The generally accepted interpretation of this result is a flow of information within the firm concerning the merits of the innovation. We find the same empirical result following an estimation procedure similar to that used in the literature. On the other hand, we interpret this result quite differently. While ski resorts that made their initial adoptions earlier also had a higher proportion of their lifts using high-speed technology, these ski resorts also had the highest vertical drops. In other words, the initial adoption decision was in many cases motivated by the same reason for the ski resort's continued persistence in adoption of faster lift capacity making the year of initial adoption endogenous.
Rather than an epidemic informational flow, ski resorts that attract primarily avid and vacation skiers engaged in endogenous competition in quality over time leading to an expansion of lift capacity and a higher proportion of faster lifts. At the national level the main determinant of differences in the degree of persistence was the ski resort's vertical drop. On the other hand, while a ski resort catering primarily to local skiers was more likely to make initial adoptions if other ski resorts had not done so, these ski resorts were unlikely to increase their proportion of faster lifts over time. In addition, ski resorts competing primarily in the national market were not constrained by skiable acreage, while the availability of skiable acres was an important limiting factor in the degree of persistence for primarily local ski resorts. Making sharp distinctions between local and national ski resorts is not without difficulty, but our results suggest persistence in adoption consistent with our expectations. More importantly, given the wide array of theoretical models that are of relevance to persistent adoption of innovations, we argue that there is value in knowing how an innovation affects an adopting firm's production process. 
